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Abstract
Modern authorization architectures using rolebased, policy-based, and even custom solutions have
numerous flaws and challenges. A new design for
authorization architecture is presented called the
Abacus. This paper discusses the architecture that the
Abacus utilizes to overcome the issues inherent in other
proprietary and open-source authorization solutions.
Specifically, the Abacus respects domain boundaries, is
less complex than existing systems, and does not require
direct connections to domain data stores.

1. Introduction
Said Eric Evans, “Every software program relates
to some activity or interest of its user. That subject area
to which the user applies the program is the domain of
the software” [1]. Domains are areas that control a
specific set of data for an organization, e.g. HR,
engineering, or customer support. Domains are at the
heart of every computer system, storing data and
enabling the business functions of the organization.
Every existing computer system has rules
governing who is allowed to perform certain tasks or
view specific data within that system, even if the rule is
that anyone with access to the device is allowed to use
it. These rules are called authorization policies.
Domains use policies to safeguard the data within them.
Numerous commercial and custom systems in the world
today use roles and groups to control authorization, but
these have proved to lack the fine-grained control
needed, are prone to role explosion [2], and are often
difficult to keep in sync with who should be allowed to
have access [3]. In the past twenty years, several
enterprise systems have been created to allow
organizations to control authorization via authorization
policies that rely on data attributes instead of roles or
groups. While this reliance on data attributes allows for
fine-grained authorization, one problem of many
modern systems is the method of attribute gathering.
For a policy to grant authorization, the system using
the policy needs access to the attributes of the user
requesting authorization. Many current systems get
these attributes by directly accessing the database tables
where the attributes are stored. While this access method
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may allow the authorization system to get the current
value of the attribute at run-time, it poses numerous
security and domain-boundary issues, among which are
tight coupling of the authorization system to the
domains, the ability for a malicious actor to utilize the
authorization system as a pivot into production
databases, and increased authorization latency.
We propose that authorization gathering should not
be a function of the authorization system, but that the
attributes should be pushed to the authorization system
from the source domains. In storing the attributes as they
are pushed to the authorization system, checks for
authorization never require external calls (which
decreases latency), nor does the authorization system
require direct pipes to domain data stores (increasing
security and decreasing database load). We achieve this
goal by reviewing current literature and commercial
systems, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of
current technology, and providing a case study of the
implementation of the new system at a large U.S.
university.
In the past two and a half years we have created and
implemented a new authorization system that addresses
the issues above and becomes a faster, more secure, and
more architecturally-sound solution than the other
options in the authorization space. We have found that
it is possible to completely decouple the authorization
system from domain databases, allowing the domains to
truly own the attributes that they own. This paper
introduces this new solution.

2. Background
2.1. Identity and Access Management
To comprehend the problem space of authorization,
it is vital to recognize the distinction between the four
components of Identity and Access Management
(IAM): identity management, authentication, access
management, and authorization. While many domain
models conflate these components, decoupling the
functions allows us to investigate authorization without
focusing on the issues present in the other IAM pieces.
According to Recordon and Reed [4], identity
management consists of the use of identifiers and
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personally-identifiable information. An identity consists
of a minimal amount of data, possibly including keys,
certificates, or tokens [5], used to distinguish one user
from another. Identity keys, such as name, address,
membership number, exist in a system to allow humans
to make sense of the identities stored within the system.
Entities that may have an identity include users of the
system, organizations, computer applications, and
physical devices.
The process of confirming that a person or system
is who they profess to be is called authentication. It is
easy in a digital world to pretend to be someone or
something else (as evidenced by a popular cartoon, On
the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog) [6], but
through verification of credentials and other methods [7]
a system can be more certain that the entity being
communicated with is indeed who they say that they are.
Certain attributes are maintained by the pillar of
access management. This includes role and group
management systems. While the aim of policy-based
access control (PBAC) is to reduce the requirement for
roles and groups, legacy systems often rely on roles and
groups. Manual designations are most easily designated
by adding them to a group or giving them a specific role.
With authorization a user has the permission to
perform the actions desired. Depending on the system,
authorization is a result of arbitrary designation by the
business, inherent from a position, or granted by
delegation. It is herein proposed that authorization
should be granted through policies that rely on
attributes, with a specific architecture to enable such.

2.2. Individual Authorization and Access
Control Lists
When computers were first invented, a user could
type the command for a program and it would run. As
systems began to allow multiple users to access them,
authorization was required to prevent unauthorized
access to specific data. Oft times a table with a list of
users authorized for a specific program was kept, and if
the user was in the table, then they could run the
program. Sometimes an Access Control List (ACL) only
allowed communication from specific IP addresses to
protect access.
While ACLs and individual authorization were
good as an initial step, they had their problems. To begin
with, every person or system address had to be
individually added to the access table. This required
manual effort on the part of the administrator, and if they
were not in the office when a new user wanted access,
then the new user may have to wait for hours or days

before receiving access. This also presented a problem
in the opposite direction: it was also common for a user
to still have authorization when they left an organization
because the administrator forgot to remove them from
the list, either by oversight or from being uniformed
about the departure.

2.3. Roles and Groups
The next type of authorization came in the form of
roles and groups. A role is like a permission for a
specific task or function, and a group was simply a
group of people in a list. Functionally equivalent, a
system would check if the user had a specific role or a
was in a certain group to grant authorization to the user.
This meant that program code could specify a role or
group instead of looking for a certain user in a table, but
the manual challenges of adding or removing
roles/groups from the user remained.
Roles and groups have been the de-facto standard
for decades. Almost every enterprise resource planning
(ERP) system in existence uses roles and groups to
administer access and grant authorization to program
functions and data. Numerous commercial [8] and
open-source solutions [9] have been developed to
manage roles and groups.

2.4. Attribute and Policy-based Systems
While the idea for authorization systems relying on
policies and attributes has been around for decades, the
real effort in this area did not begin until the turn of the
millennium. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC)
and PBAC serve to provide an authorization decision by
utilizing an authorization engine that is separate from
the system that the user is attempting to access. This
engine is commonly called the Policy Decision Point
(PDP). Other common components of authorization
systems include the Policy Administration Point (PAP)
which allows domain owners to create policies, and
Policy Information Points (PIPs) that are responsible for
gathering attributes [10].
There are many advantages to using attributes and
policies over roles and groups, to the point that research
has been conducted to see if ABAC policies can be used
within a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
framework [11]. The benefits of PBAC including the
ability to know which systems use which attributes, ease
of auditing, enabling systems to use attributes from
other domains in their policies, and separation of
authorization logic from business logic. It is unknown
to the authors of any commercial systems that utilize this
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methodology inherently, yet there are several
companies that offer ABAC/PBAC services to
organizations [12]–[14]. While these systems offer a
simpler way of checking authoring and evaluating
authorization logic, most modern architectures do not
respect domain boundaries and suffer from inherent
latency issues.

things that are not necessarily available to ACLs or rolebased systems.
This paper will enumerate the advantages of
attributes and policies in authorization. It will then
evaluate the difficulties of current implementations and
provide solutions using a new methodology contained
in a technology that we call the Abacus.

2.5. Domain Authorization Through
Authorization Policies
A well-implemented domain consists of several
parts: a central data store (CDS) that holds the relevant
domain data, events that are raised as certain business
processes occur, application programmable interfaces
(APIs) that enable other systems to interact with the
domain, data retrieval integration protocols (DRIP) for
data lakes that enable metrics, and other such features.
In an idea promoted as “Hexagonal Architecture”,
Cockburn says that there should be no “...infiltration of
business logic into the user interface code” [15] and that
the APIs should make available the business functions
of the domain. Vernon states that domain models should
be “technology-free” [16] and not contain
implementation-specific details. In this way “the data
model should be subordinate” [17], meaning that the
domain model should care about the business of the
domain and not the data model that becomes the
implementation of the business model.
We support Cockburn’s assertion that domain
business logic should be controlled from inside of the
domain and Vernon’s statements regarding domain
models focused on the business processes. We seek to
expand upon these ideas with what we call General
Moore’s Medallion, named after Brent Moore, Chief
Solutions Architect at Brigham Young University. In
Figure 1 we see that the core of a domain is surrounded
by authorization policies, and these policies protect
access to the domain components. For example, when
an API is queried, the authorization policies for that API
should be evaluated to see if the calling user/system is
authorized for the data. Similarly, if an event is raised
by the domain, policies should govern what subscribers
are authorized by the domain to receive the event. This
pattern should persist in all accesses to the domain.
Using policies to govern authorization provide
several advantages over previous authorization
methodologies [18]. Fine-grained control is possible
with policies, and access can be based on dynamic
properties such as time of day, calling client system,
user employment status, or other volatile factors—

Figure 1. General Moore's Medallion shows that
authorization policies should protect every aspect
of a domain.

3. Issues with Existing Technologies
While developing code to give access to a user with
a specific role was a large step forward, decades of this
method of authorization has revealed massive issues.
The problems range from maintenance to authorization
granularity to data leakage will now be enumerated and
explained.

3.1. Role Explosion
Over time it was discovered that role-based systems
suffered from role explosion [2], a phenomenon
resulting from authorization requiring a granularity that
is not available with roles. With attributes it is easy to
create a policy that requires specific attribute values, but
a system that can only check for a single role suffers
from an issue of combinatorics. If there are three
attributes, each with three possible values, then a total
of sixty-three roles would need to be created to express
every combination of these three attributes together:
nine individual roles (one for each attribute value), plus
another twenty-seven roles (for each combination of
only two attribute values), plus another twenty-seven
roles (for the possibilities of all three attributes).
For example, a system might allow a user to access
it if the user is a faculty member. The role of “Faculty”
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may be given to the user, and this will enable them to
access the said system. The problem begins when such
a wide role is not enough; additional roles of “Tenured
Faculty” and “Associate Faculty” might be created for
more specific system functionality. When the
distinction of “Research Faculty” or “Teaching Faculty”
arises, the number of roles increases. The number of
roles continues to grow over time, requiring
increasingly precise niches, such as “Research Faculty
with Federal Grant” or “Research Faculty without
Funding”.
Eventually, systems with roles required hundreds or
thousands of roles to express what was going on for
individual functions in systems. At this point, when a
new system would be developed, instead of just finding
a role that matched the need, the developer would just
create a new role, to avoid spending exorbitant amounts
of time looking through the existing roles. Similarly,
role explosion makes maintenance completely
untenable for an administrator of a role management
system. With thousands of roles, it is extremely timeconsuming to find roles that match the required
functionality of a new system, or to find which roles are
no longer in use.

3.2. Data Leakage
Another problem with roles and groups is the issue
of data leakage. If a person has the permission to view
the roles and groups of an individual user, then they can
learn confidential things about that user. For instance, if
the user has a role called “Six-figure salary”, then it can
be determined that the user makes a lot of money. If the
group “Sexual harassment victim” is present, then
someone can know information that should not be made
available. Such data leakage can have extremely
detrimental effects on individuals and on an
organization, not to mention legal ramifications.

3.3. Usage Invisibility
The problem with a role/group governance system
is the lack of knowing what other systems utilize which
roles or groups. If Program A requires Role B, then
Program A will ask the role manager if the current user
has Role B in order to authorize the use for their current
operation. While this is useful to Program A, the role
manager has no inherent way to know that Program A
uses Role B. This presents a massive issue when
transitioning from old systems to new ones, as system
administrators do not know which applications need to
be updated.

To illustrate this fact, one organization had the
following experience. Years ago, the Federal
Government of the United States changed the definition
of part-time employee. The organization had certain
groups that signified the description for the old part-time
status, and they were forced to create new groups based
on the new government definitions. There was no way
to tell from the group database who was using which
groups, nor was there any way to know from the LDAP
directories that housed copies of these groups. The only
way to know was to look at the code for every system in
the organization.
The engineer tasked with this change had an idea:
every Monday morning he would remove the old parttime groups from the database and LDAP directories.
He would then wait until a couple of departments had
called to complain that their systems were no longer
working. He would then restore the groups and spend
the remainder of the week moving those departments to
the new part-time groups. Come Monday morning he
would repeat the process and work with the new callers
to fix the groups used by their departments’ code.
Sometimes a department would call multiple times,
because their authorization logic was in multiple
segments of code. It was six months before all the
organization had been moved to the new part-time
groups.
From such a painful example it is easy to see the
benefit that comes from being able to quickly query
what systems utilize which attributes.

4. Problems with Modern ABAC/PBAC
Architectures
There are numerous architectural considerations
with modern commercial authorization system that arise
out of the architectural model of said systems. The
central design of these systems is to host a decision
engine, the PDP, that is responsible for calculating an
authorization decision for an identity. When the PDP is
queried, the common method is for the PDP to call a PIP
to gather the attributes in real-time from the domains
that own the attributes. The PIPs are often “connectors”
that go straight to the central data store (CDS) of the
domain and directly retrieve the attribute value from a
database table. It is this method of attribute gathering
that causes significant issues with security, latency, and
maintainability. We will address several issues with the
current methodologies before proposing our solutions in
this section.
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4.1. Current Authorization Flow
For many instances, the process to get data from a
domain begins with a user or other system that makes a
request to the domain (see Figure 2). The domain
verifies that the caller is approved for such data, then
returns it. Several modern authorization systems
modify this by placing a Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) before the domain. The PEP is responsible for
calling the Policy Decision Point (PDP) which
calculates the authorization decision, and if approved,
the PEP passes the calling request to the domain. The
domain gets the data and returns it to the PEP. The PEP
may then filter the data, based on the authorization
policies, before returning it to the caller. Here is the
normal flow of modern systems:
1. A user or system requests access to a resource.
2. The PEP takes the request, determines who/what is
making the call, and sends a request to the PDP for
authorization.
3. PIPs request data from other domain stores.
4. Attribute data is returned to the PDP.
5. The PDP calculates the authorization and returns a
response to the PEP.
6. a. If the result is “Deny”, then the PEP is directed
to return a “Not Authorized” message to the caller.
b. If the result is “Permit”, then the request is
forwarded to the domain.
7. The domain checks the business rules to see if it
should send an error or the requested resource.
8. If the business rules check out, the domain queries
its CDS to get the data.
9. The CDS returns the relevant data to the domain.
10. The domain returns the data to the PEP.
11. The PEP may filter the data based on various
authorization configurations.
12. The PEP returns the authorized data to the caller.
This model requiring a PEP has several
disadvantages: increased cost, increased latency,

conflated authorization and business logic, connectivity
configuration complexity, and endpoint configuration
complexity.
First, the greater the number of components
required for authorization, the greater the cost. Both the
PEP and the PDP have a cost to install, configure, and
run. Both must be operative for this model to work,
requiring additional server allocation and running
expense.
Second, if the domain were calculating
authorization on its own, it would only require the
network hops to get the attributes needed for its
decision. With a PEP in place, the number of network
hops is reduced for authorization, only to replace it with
four more hops: going to the PEP, going to the PDP,
returning from the PDP to the PEP, and from the PEP
back to the caller. Additionally, the PEP can become a
network bottleneck if there are a significant number of
requests going to various domains that must all be sent
via the PEP.
Third, since all traffic must pass through the PEP,
the PEP must be configured to know the location of
every system that it may stand as the guardian for. This
requires significant operational resources to make sure
that any change in domain location is accurately updated
within the PEP. This places increased demand on
DevOps teams to ensure that nothing in a domain
change has broken the ability for extant entities to
contact it.
Finally, being a gatekeeper, the PEP must know
every endpoint, protocol type, and available contact
methods for the domains that it is protecting. Setting this
configuration is well beyond the realm of the domain’s
business owners and falls squarely into the hands of IT.
By placing this burden on IT, the business owner is
further removed from the ability to easily change things,
should they require it.

Figure 2. Existing authorization architecture
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4.2. Breaking Domain Boundaries
The core tenants of Domain-Driven Design (DDD)
espouse that the business processes of the domain
govern the access and use of the data within the domain.
When any external entity connects to the CDS of a
domain, all data governance is lost, for the domain has
no way to mitigate access to the data. The domain itself
should maintain the protection of data from external
sources, making that data only available via APIs,
events, claims, and so forth, each validating requests
through domain-controlled policies.
Letting users and systems connect directly to data
stores without their domain creates a major security risk.
The more connections that come into a database, the
more likely it is that one of those users will be
compromised at some point, allowing access.

4.3. Attribute Gathering
All retrieval of attributes in any authorization
methodology must be fast. While there are numerous
ways to accomplish this, each has limitations. Possible
options include the run-time retrieval of attributes,
caching attributes within the memory space of the
decision engine itself, utilizing an external cache with
complex logic to determine when to expire attributes
and when to refresh them from the central data stores, or
employing a persistent cache that always contains the
full set of existing attributes. We will now evaluate each
option to provide its drawbacks and advantages.
It is possible to keep cached data within the
memory space of the engine, but this requires the
implementation of the cache code within the engine,
adding complexity. It also requires that the system
running the engine use larger and larger amounts of
memory as the number of attributes in the cache grows.
Run-time retrieval of attributes is the best way to
ensure that the attribute is accurate at the time of the
request. The issues that arise in this situation are those
of latency and domain resiliency. For the engine to
make a request out to the domain with attributes, PIP
must either go directly against the data source (which
has been addressed before), or they must query an
intermediary system. To query an API or data system
requires additional time and configuration. If a domain
goes down, then all authorization dependent upon the
attributes in that domain will no longer work until the
domain is back online.
The problems of complexity, latency, and possible
outages can be avoided if the system is correctly
designed. We will present the proper architecture next.

5. The Abacus: A New Architecture for
Authorization
The Abacus is a policy-based authorization
management system (see Figure 3). It sits inside of the
same network as the business systems and the only
systems that are inside this network can invoke the
Abacus. The data flow of Abacus consists of 7 steps:
1. A user or system requests access to a resource.
2. The domain takes the request, determines who/what
is making the call, and sends a request to the Abacus
for authorization.
3. The Abacus calculates the authorization and returns
a response to the domain.
4.
a. If the result is “Deny”, then the domain returns
a “Not Authorized” message to the caller.
b. If the result is “Permit”, then the domain
checks the business rules to see if it should
send an error or the requested resource.
5. If the business rules check out, the domain queries
its CDS, with whatever business rules it requires, to
get the data.
6. The CDS returns the relevant data to the domain.
7. The domain returns the data to the caller.
Compared to existing models, this architecture
provides several advantages: reduced cost, decreased
latency, separation of authorization and business logic,
simplified connectivity configuration, simplified
endpoint configuration. We will expound upon these
further in the next major section.
As mentioned previously in this paper, existing
authorization systems require either 1) a connection to
domain data for run-time retrieval, or 2) that all
information required to calculate a decision is passed in
the request to the PDP. The Abacus solves the
challenges presented through these methodologies by
utilizing a persistent cache of all attributes that the
policies need. The cache is kept current through the
updates of the domains that own the attributes: when an
attribute that the domain controls changes for a user, that
change is then pushed to the Abacus via a simple API.
5.1. Defining Policies
All PBAC systems define policies, as does the
Abacus, but the method at which those policies are
combined to define authorization for resources differs.
While other systems require an administrator to define a
resource, then define the actions available to a resource,
the Abacus simplifies this process into one step: a policy
set is defined as an action on a resource. By so doing,
the policy set becomes technology-agnostic. Many
systems today promote REST methods for web
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contexts. Should a new protocol come around, all of the
existing systems will need to change, but the Abacus can
continue unhindered.
For example, an authorization system may define
resource A as an HTTPS endpoint representing certain
records for the domain, and then it configures GET,
POST, and DELETE methods. If a user invokes the
GET method to view records, the PDP will evaluate the
policy set for that method on that resource. But if in the
future the technology moves away from REST, then the
whole of this configuration must be redone.
In contrast, the Abacus would define a policy set of
“ViewResourceA”, and then the calling API can
interpret the technology that it uses (which may be a
GET method) to request “ViewResourceA”. In the
future, if the domain changes to a new technology
(which does not use “GET”), the action on the resource
does not change, and the domain still calls for
“ViewResourceA”, no matter how the technology of the
API is administered. This forward-compatible
architecture further decouples authorization from the
domains.

5.2. Persistent Cache
The most efficient way to return information from
a data store is to keep that data in memory. Thus, the
most effective model for attribute retrieval involves the
use of a persistent cache, one that never expires rows
and contains a complete copy of all attributes needed for
authorization policies. This Attribute Cache is located
as close to the decision engine as possible to reduce the
latency between the two. It has the advantage in
providing the engine with all available attributes as
needed—even if the domain that owns a set of required
attributes goes off-line. In this way, authorization can

continue even as domains are serviced for maintenance
or become inaccessible in unforeseen instances.
Only attributes that exist should be placed in the
cache, to wit, only attributes that will cause a policy to
evaluate to “true”. For instance, if a policy requires that
the user be an employee to access a specific resource,
then the system should only store the employee attribute
for those that work for the organization. There may be
thousands, or millions, of other IDs within the system
that the Attribute Cache contains attributes for who are
not employees: clients, customers, devices, etc.
Restricting the cache to contain only attributes that exist
for an ID allows for data reduction in the cache size by
orders of magnitude. Another added benefit is
simplification of the decision engine logic: if an
attribute is not present in the cache for an ID, then that
entity does not have the attribute and processing will
respond appropriately.

5.3. Attribute Database
While a cache is excellent for performant data
retrieval during decision requests, it does not provide a
permanent store for the collection of attributes known to
the system. It is possible to replicate the cache database,
but there are not many tools (if any) for this. By design,
the cache is kept with as little information within it to
make it lightweight and fast. No data about who or what
added the attribute, when it occurred, or what the
definition of the attribute even is, exists in the cache.
There must be Attribute Database to maintain the master
record of the attributes stored in the engine which keeps
these points of data.
The Attribute Database should contain the expected
items for attributes, such as the attribute type, value, and
the ID that has the attribute, but it should also maintain
the ID of the user or system that added the attribute,

Figure 3. The Abacus
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timestamp of when the attribute was added, and other
such things that are too bulky to be stored in the
Attribute Cache.
A persistent store of all known attributes provides
several advantages to the decision engine, though it
never directly interacts with the engine. When a new
Attribute Cache is initialized, it can pull the list of
attributes from the Attribute Database and be operative
in a matter of seconds. This also enables the
administrators to remove all data from the cache and
quickly restore the full record if there are ever concerns
about data integrity. Backup and recovery of the
Attribute Database is easy with tools that exist for
whatever platform the organization chooses to work
with.

5.4. Attribute Updates
When using a cache that does not expire rows, the
natural question of data integrity arises. What happens
when an attribute changes in a domain? There must be a
system that allows attributes in the cache to be modified.
For the Abacus, we take the complexity of cache
ejections, refreshes, and so forth away from the cache
and put it in the hands of the domain, where it rightly
belongs. The system has an API that allows domains to
push attributes changes (that they control) into the
Abacus. Since the domain alone knows when an
attribute within it changes, and the domain knows the
components of data that make up said attribute, then the
domain can easily call the Attribute Update API in the
Abacus to add or delete an attribute for a user.
The method of updating attribute in the Abacus can
be accomplished in several ways. We suggest that the
best solution is for the domain to raise events when the
governed attributes change, and to also write event
consumers that translate those events into attributes that
are then pushed to the authorization engine. By so doing,
these attribute-updating consumers can be kept in one
place and easily reviewed. Additionally, all the
implementation details of the domain are abstracted
from the consumers and code can be focused on only
pushing attributes as they are defined by the business
logic. Should any of the underlying infrastructure of the
domain change, be it database, API code, or otherwise,
the event consumer will not need to be rewritten and
authorization updates can continue without hindrance.

6. Advantages of the Abacus
Having explained the architecture of the Abacus,
we will now enumerate upon the advantages that this

new design gives over the existing systems, and we will
show how it solves the problems of previous
authorization methodologies.

6.1 Domains Define Attributes
All business logic for a domain should be contained
and maintained within the domain. Because the Abacus
specifically requires the domains to push attributes into
it, the business definition of the attribute is maintained
by the domain itself. We suggest that all domains record
the definitions of their attributes in a central tool so that
any other domain within the organization can
understand the attributes as well.
By allowing domains to truly control their
attributes, the authorization system no longer needs to
completely understand the domain business in order to
do its job. This allows the authorization administrators
to focus on other tasks, plus it allows those from other
domains to learn the ubiquitous language of the domain
in question (and vice versa).
The domain also knows best about how and what it
should filter before returning data to a user. Removing
the PEP allows the domain to fully perform its primary
functions (including data filtration). Instead of requiring
the business logic to be placed inside of the
authorization component, this architecture allows for
good microservice design, letting the authorization be a
complete package in its sphere while the domain
handles the business filtering that it understands
inherently. This both gives the domain control over data
and simplifies the authorization process as well.

6.2 Respected Domain Boundaries
The web of interconnected, tightly-coupled
domains goes away with the design of the Abacus.
DDD principles are respected when only the domain has
access to its data stores. No longer are other systems
reaching into the domain database, and the domain is
free to change the underlying structure as it sees fit, per
its business needs, without the threat of breaking other
systems.
This massive decoupling allows each domain to
operate effectively as a microservice. The business
owners can define the domain logic while the
developers can implement each component completely
independent of other systems, and authorization can be
provided as an external service that places no load on
the domain itself.
As domains push their attributes into the Abacus,
both systems are utilizing a well-defined contract, and
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the authorization system itself becomes a domain that
also has its boundaries respected.

6.3 Efficiency
Using the domain as the PEP itself provides
financial and chronotical advantages. If the domain
enforces the decision of the authorization engine, it
removes the cost of running a PEP server. Besides the
hardware and electricity cost, there is also the reduced
work of the professionals that would have had to
configure the PEP.
From a latency perspective, removing the PEP and
PIP calls to domain stores eliminates at least six extra
network hops. This in addition to the time spent in the
PEP filtering data, allows the Abacus to provide a more
efficient response.
Additionally, because the Abacus is constructed
with a policy grammar specifically designed for its
architecture, it is more efficient than other systems (we
will be writing another paper in the future to discuss this
in depth).

6.4 Simplified Configuration
Modern authorization architectures often require
specific configuration of domain endpoints, including
endpoint address, method types, authentication tokens,
etc. Such technical specificity means that the IT staff
must be the ones to define the interactions with the PDP.
By design, the Abacus only defines actions on
resources, which removes the need for specific
connections to other systems. This simplifies
configuration, as the authorization engine does not need
to have any explicit connections to other domains
defined within it. A domain may change its endpoints,
but since the Abacus defines its policy sets as actions on
a resource, no reconfiguration is needed.

6.5 Data Security
The ability to ask the Abacus for an authorization
decision without passing lots of data back and forth is a
huge win for data security and privacy. As with the
example of the bouncer at a club, instead of handing
over all your information on your ID, just to get an
authorization decision about your age, the bouncer can
now ask the Abacus, which checks the necessary
attributes and returns an authorization to the bouncer,
who then acts based on the response. No longer do
systems need the information from other domains, just
to find out if the caller is authorized. A domain can make

available sensitive attributes to the authorization domain
and have no worries about those attributes ever being
leaked to other systems, yet that data can still be used
for decisions.
As DDD is respected, a domain will have few
connections to its CDS. This results in easier
administration of the domain, and there are less
concerns about access from compromised credentials as
there are less credentials available. Security is more
easily moderated when there are only a few people with
manually-assigned roles or groups while policies take
care of the majority of the cases.

6.6 Reverse Query Functionality
The most powerful advantage of the Attribute
Database is the ability to run queries against it. Domain
owners often want to know, for auditing purposes or
otherwise, “Who has access to this resource?” Because
all the policies authorizing the resource are known to the
engine, and thus the attributes needed, and since the
Attribute Database contains the list of current resources,
SQL statements can be constructed that query the
Attribute Database for the IDs that have the requisite
attributes.
Some modern PBAC systems contain reverse query
functionality, but some do not. Of those that do, some
require queries to be executed directly against domain
production databases. This has the disadvantages of
increased load on production systems. Also, if the data
store is not a relational database, multiple types of
queries must be constructed and then combined to give
a response. With the Abacus, these reverse query
statements are executed against the Attribute Database
which neither 1) impacts domain servers, nor 2) impacts
the performance of the decision engine itself.
Production domains can use any type of storage model
that they want, and the Abacus can still quickly generate
a list of authorized entities because the attribute storage
is decoupled from the domains.

7. Disadvantages of the Abacus
The Abacus provides significant advantages over
existing architectures, as previously presented. While
powerful, flexible, and novel, there are some
considerations that must be evaluated before it can be
implemented.
First, there is initial setup of the attributes takes
time and effort. Domain owners must agree on the
definition of an attribute. The technical integration work
must then be done to push new attribute values to the
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Abacus whenever the values change for identities in the
system. Additionally, if domain A requires attributes
from domain B, then the same work must be done in
domain B to enable the policies from A to work
properly, and this effort needs to be budgeted within B’s
schedule.
While not a technical challenge, the process of
making business owners more directly responsible for
their data governance does invoke push-back from some
people. Traditionally, businesses will hand the policy
requirements to IT teams and expect the work to be
done. We have found that asking business owners to
take ownership of the policies occasionally produces
feelings of resentment and stubbornness where some
feel that “that’s IT’s job”.
The most difficult concern is data synchronization
issues. When a message changing an attribute is dropped
somewhere, then the Abacus may be permitting or
denying inaccurately. One possible mitigation technique
is to use database ETL (extract-transform-load)
processes to verify accuracy with the source domains,
but this breaches domain boundaries. Alternatively, an
API could be created to allow domains to view the
attributes that they own within the Abacus. The domains
could then compare what the Abacus has with what they
contain and (re)push needed changes. Future research
should investigate this problem.

8. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new architecture for
authorization that completely respects DDD principles,
simplifies the architecture of the authorization domain,
more effectively secures data within domains, and gives
more control over data access to domain owners. The
Abacus ensures that domains may change technology
without needing to rewrite their authorization logic, and
domains can use attributes that are governed and
maintained by other systems without needing to know
the implementation and/or business logic of those
systems. Configuration becomes much easier and
simpler than utilizing roles or groups, or even than
systems which require implementation details of the
domain itself. We affirm that the Abacus is breaking
new ground in authorization.
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